SPEECH BY DR JAVIER SOLANA,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL
AND HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR
THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
WEHRKUNDE
It is both a pleasure and an honour to address this Conference, which is highly regarded as one of the most important fora for discussing the security challenges which confront the international community.
The dramatic changes in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War have underlined the importance of occasions such as these for bringing together experts from different fields and disciplines. Increasing interdependence means that we have to extend our sights beyond Europe and the transatlantic relationship. I therefore particularly welcome the participation of representatives from Asia.
Increasing interdependence also means that we have to work together to face the challenges of the Twenty-First Century. I should like to focus this afternoon on Europe's contribution to that task.
Over the last fifty years, Europe has developed an extensive range of tools which it can use in support of its foreign policy objectives. Our intention is to strengthen these and make them more effective. Having the capacity to use force when all other means fail is an essential component of a credible foreign policy.
The idea of a European security and defence policy is not new. It has been on Europe's agenda since 1945. And for good reason. The European Union is one of the most advanced examples of regional integration in the world, particularly in the economic field. But its origins and its vocation have always been political. In the long-term, security and defence must be an integral part of it.
The realities of the Cold War have meant that the transatlantic relationship has been dominated by the issue of collective defence. For over fifty years NATO has been the only institution capable of responding to the challenge of both safeguarding transatlantic links and of organising the effective defence of a free and democratic Europe. It has been remarkably successful.
NATO and its members have consistently encouraged Europe in its efforts to forge a defence identity. Too often, the lack of progress has been the result, not of doubts from our allies, but of a lack of will within Europe itself.
There are two reasons why this is changing. The first is the profound change in the strategic interests of Europe following the end of the Cold War. We no longer face the threat of massive conventional and non-conventional attack. There are new challenges. They may not threaten our existence. But they threaten our way of life, our values and our interests.
In this new environment, our transatlantic partners rightly no longer see it as their role to intervene in every regional crisis on the European continent. There will be occasions when we will be able to agree between us that Europe should take the lead.
The second factor is the degree of integration within Europe. The countries of the European Union now have extensive shared interests across a wide range of areas. It makes sense to share the means to defend these interests.
The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have sounded an alarm bell for Europe's leaders and European public opinion. They revealed the shortcomings of European national and collective military capabilities. Europe may have sufficient numbers of troops, but it does not yet have the capabilities required to project and sustain them in order to manage today's security challenges, let alone a those of tomorrow.
This is why European leaders decided at their summit meeting in December in Helsinki to develop by 2003 a collective European capability to deploy rapidly 60,000 troops for crisis management operations. They established clear deadlines for this task. They also set in train work on the detailed arrangements which will be needed for a properly functioning Security and Defence Policy. This includes the important issues of relations with NATO and the role of European countries that are not members of the Union.
Let me first address the issue of EU-NATO relations and the future of the transatlantic partnership.
I am convinced that the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy will strengthen both our relations with NATO and the transatlantic relationship. There are a number of reasons for this. Let me start with the issue of defence capabilities.
Putting practical military strength at the top of our agenda should reassure our North American allies. We are doing what they have urged us to do for decades. We are defining a practical goal and putting in place the institutions to achieve it. We have avoided unnecessary squabbling over institutions. They are not an end in themselves.
Our objective is to be able to respond in crisis management situations. We are not trying to duplicate the role of NATO. Collective defence will remain NATO's business.
This same principle underpins NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative. This identified concrete goals and moved away from the generalised approach of the more traditional NATO force planning process. As a result, the DCI and the EU's Headline Goal complement one another.
This means that they will together put pressure on individual governments. They have the same aims: greater modernisation, professional isation, strict resource priorities, closer cooperation among leading nations in each sector, interoperability, intra-European burden-sharing and perhaps some task specialisation.
All these areas offer scope for rationalisation. We have to change - we are moving away from monolithic standing armies to the creation of a rapid reaction capability. But this will take time. It may require more financial resources. But if we want to be credible, individual governments may have to be ready to back these policies with additional funds. We cannot expect to have security on the cheap. Nor can we allow anyone to use the excuse that EU and NATO were sending out conflicting signals, or working for different objectives.
We are not in the business of trying to create a European army. The headline goal will be met by improving existing national forces or multinational formations, the great majority of which are also already committed to NATO. This military capability will be complemented by the development of a civilian capacity quite different from anything contemplated by NATO. It will form a crucial element of our ability to respond to crises.
The task ahead for the Union is challenging. It will only succeed if it works in co-operation with the existing force planning work of NATO. It will need to draw on direct or indirect support from NATO and the WEU. But it will help to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.
This process will include the non-aligned members of the EU which are all now formal partners of NATO. They have agreed to follow NATO's force planning advice. They are ready to serve with NATO in peace support operations. Serious efforts are underway to strengthen Eurocorps - and I would hope, other existing European force groups. They will serve as a credible option for the command of EU-Ied operations. This too will bring benefit to NATO. It will widen the range of European command options which will also be available for use by the Alliance.
Is there a risk that the EU's new decision-making structures will duplicate or interfere with NATO? I am convinced this will not happen. The EU has paid NATO the sincere compliment of imitation. A guiding principle in developing the EU's politicallmilitary structures is compatibility, with NATO.
The reasons for this are practical, not institutional. There is obvious benefit in mirroring NATO's structures. Their processes have been shown to work. If Europe is to have access to NATO assets, such an approach provides the best guarantee that we can cooperate effectively at both the staff and the decision making level.
But we must avoid duplication. Planning and command structures already exist in NATO and are designed with European dual use in mind. There must be a single military culture. We cannot expect our troops operating in life-or-death situations to operate by two different rule books.
Under what circumstances will Europe use its new capabilities? We made clear at Helsinki that the EU will act "where NATO as a whole is not engaged". This will remain a guiding principle. NATO has unique strengths and advantages which are recognised by everybody, including the Europeans. The EU also has strengths and advantages. These are beginning to be recognised by NATO and the US. We must exploit our strengths and co-ordinate our efforts.
Competition between NATO and the EU is only helpful insofar as it is constructive and promotes excellence. Open and frank consultation from the start of any crisis is the only way to reach a decision on who should take the lead. We have to accept that we each have different assets and talents which can complement each other. This requires a mature strategic view. This is what the US has for so long been pressing its European partners to develop.
Madeleine Albright said recently that the United States and Europe are "cousins, not clones". I agree. Our shared values, our democratic concepts of international partnership and integration are surely robust enough to deal with any growing pains that may be part of such an approach. The addition of military competence to the EU, and the responsibilities that this will bring, will strengthen Europe's strategic vision. But it will do so in a way which is in the interests of the US.
I would like to close by looking briefly at the role of other European states and Allies in the European security and defence policy.
At Helsinki the EU made it clear that it wished to involve its European partners. It promised both the NATO Europeans and the candidates for accession a degree of permanent involvement in its pre-operation work. It offered them the opportunity to participate once the EU has taken the decision to launch an operation.
The decision to launch operations has to be for the Fifteen. We must respect the legal character of the Union. And we also have to ensure coherence with other parallel measures in other fields.
But the message is clear: we want to be as inclusive as possible. And we welcome the undertakings made since Helsinki by many of these countries, especially the non-EU Allies, to contribute both to the European headline goal and future operations. Our approach is to enlist other like-minded Europeans to our cause. We hope that other countries, including Russia and Ukraine, will be ready to join us by participating in crisis management operations.
My experience as NATO Secretary General showed me the value of co-operation. When the European nations differ amongst themselves and differ with the US, our effectiveness suffers. This characterised our approach to the Balkans from 1991 to 1995. When we co-operate amongst ourselves in Europe and across the Atlantic we can be a powerful force in support of our shared objectives. The success of Dayton and the gradual return to peace in the Balkans shows that this is possible.
But we are not complacent. The Alliance wants to do better. We want to do better. We want our forces to be better equipped, quicker off the mark and quicker into action. And we must be able, from time to time, to take on greater responsibility and play a leading role. It is in the interest of Europe that we succeed. But I am convinced that it is also in the interests of our North American Allies and of the Alliance as a whole.
Das geschriebene Wort der Rede muss nicht mit dem auf der Konferenz gesprochenen Wort übereinstimmen.
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Dienstag, 11.11.2003
