Autor :  Reden im Originaltext
E-mail: redaktion@e-politik.de

Kosovo - Lessons Learned: Collective Responsibility
For Conflict Management

It is a great pleasure to be here in Munich, and to attend this illustrious conference for the first time.

I am also delighted to have been asked to speak on this issue. And doubly so to speak in the company of my predecessor, George Robertson, who was so closely associated with the success of the campaign in Kosovo. Let me start by reiterating that - contrary to some revisionist opinion - the campaign was a resounding success, and a success for NATO in particular. Anyone who doubts that should visit Pristina, as I have done, and canvas opinion there. But, equally, I recognise that there will be lessons to learn after even the most successful military action.

I inherited from George an organisation keen to learn those lessons, and to do something about them. Too often in the past, we have analysed operations in considerable detail, but then not applied the same rigour in implementing our conclusions.

As a Defence Minister I, like my colleagues here today, live in the real world. And the bottom line is that if we are serious about increasing our capability to solve crises such as those in Kosovo, or East Timor, we need to make best use of the available resources and focus on the key priorities. And as well as learning lessons and preparing ourselves for the next time, we must not forget that there is still a job that needs to be done on the ground. We need to remain fully engaged until the job is done.

The deplorable events in Mitronica and north Kosovo over the past few days have highlighted the continuing tensions, and the continuing role of the international community in promoting stability.

In London, the work underway on Kosovo lessons is designed to identify specific problems and to come up with specific, concrete solutions. There have been some real shortcomings exposed in Allied - especially European capabilities in several important areas. Looking at the air campaign, there were shortfalls in fields such as precision attack, secure communications and the crucial force multipliers such as Electronic Warfare and Air to Air Refuelling. And in our preparations for the deployment of the peacekeeping force, we have seen the importance of having more of our forces readier quickly, and more quickly deployable.

There is a specific lesson here for European defence. And the Helsinki Headline Goal demonstrates our determination to address it. But that is the subject for our discussion this afternoon.

Nor is this the right sort of forum for a detailed look at the performance of our equipment, although many of you here will want to talk about this in due course. And we need to make sure that the people we have working for us are sharing the lessons, and doing something about them. This is being addressed, in part, through the Defence Capabilities Initiative at NATO. The British Government is committed to this programme, and is determined to make it work. By working together to plug the gaps in our capabilities, we can make very real improvements and share the costs of doing so. It's the way of the future, and we must embrace it.

But while equipment is important, I want today to focus on another key area. That is, our collective capability and responsibility for conflict management to look at how nations and organisations can work together better in the future, building on the lessons of Kosovo.

Undoubtedly, when we act together, as nations or through organisations, our actions or messages are stronger. But we do not always get it right.

Kosovo was in many ways a case study in collective engagement and action. Collectively we knew what we wanted to achieve - to bring an end to the repression of Kosovan civilians. And this was, of course, the aim not just those who in the end took part in the military action against Milosevic, but also of, among others, our Russian friends.

Before, during and after the air operations, we have worked together in a number of different fora to achieve our objectives. In the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, the Contact Group and the G8, we have defined our aims and spoken out collectively against repression and human rights violations. Collective engagement during the crisis was obviously effective in the military field. On the diplomatic front it became focused on the work of the envoys Ahtisaahri and Chernomyrdin. Their efforts showed that collective diplomacy could still make a major difference in bringing about a solution. And since the conflict, we have worked together to begin to rebuild Kosovo. So collective action military, diplomatic and political can work. That is a clear lesson.

In many crises, this collective engagement at the diplomatic and political level is likely to be enough. But it was not enough here. Why? In essence, it is because Milosevic did not believe that we could or would do what we said we would do.

Although the message was coming out from NATO that we were prepared to take military action if we needed to, he did not believe us. He was clearly convinced that an Alliance of 16 - then 19 - countries would not stick together. He believed that if he could play on our differences he could win. He was wrong. But his error also indicates a failing on our part. The messages we sent were not received. What should we learn from this? How should we do it better, if there is a next time?

If we agree that we should use force, and this should always be as a last resort, we must make clear that we are prepared to use it. Bullies are always encouraged by signs of weakness. We must always mean what we say. And there are two sub-aspects to this.

First, we need to agree amongst ourselves that we will act if we need to. We must never use empty threats.

And second, we need to convince all those who listen to us that we mean what we say. As the leaders of public opinion, we need to convince our publics that what we are involving ourselves in - either diplomatically or militarily - is right. If we can get our publics behind us, get them to believe that what we are doing is right, and that we are determined and resolute, then our opponents are more likely to get the message

In short, we need to be clear about what we want. We need to make clear what we are prepared to do to achieve our objectives. We also need to mean what we say. We need to be prepared to deliver, if required. And I emphasise the word we. I am not talking of unilateral action. I am not talking about pursuit of narrow self-interest. I am talking of collective action. Acting collectively, we will be far stronger - militarily, diplomatically and politically - than any of us can be acting alone.

Of course, each of our nations will retain its sovereign right to make its own decisions. This is never more important than when we take military decisions, sending our young people into danger.

So we will never take collective decisions as quickly as purely national ones. There is bound to be an element of drag. But it is essential that we do all in our power to minimise delay. Our collective strength will be dissipated if we do not move quickly. And the risk will grow that an opponent will think we do not mean what we say. We must find ways to streamline our decision making.

If we have all these ingredients, then it should be easier for us to convince our opponents, as well as our public opinion, and conflict should be much less likely.

But collective action is, of course, about far more than trying to prevent conflict, or being prepared to act militarily if our opponents are immune to reason. Collectively, we need to be prepared to act to deal with the consequences of conflict or other disasters.

During the Kosovo conflict, there were excellent examples of the UNHCR and charities working hand in hand with NATO soldiers and host governments. Working together to deal with the desperate humanitarian suffering that they confronted among the refugees. The scale was overwhelming. There was a great deal of improvisation. But experts in humanitarian relief were instrumental in stabilising the situation. There is much we can learn from each other in the international organisations, nations and charities. We need to do much more to be prepared for similar emergencies in future. We should exchange our experts, and learn from their experiences. Military and civil exercises can make a real difference.

I would apply this lesson in particular to the process of reconstruction. Here we have tangible evidence of international cooperation. In Kosovo, UNMIK and KIFOR are the key pillars of the international effort. We are also engaged in a similar job in East Timor. And we remain involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia. But have we learned the lessons of Bosnia?

In some respects, yes. But we could and should have done more. It is particularly worrying that yet again it took time to get the civil structures up and running. We have been accused of losing the peace. This is an exaggeration. But the failure to get a civil administration in place, and in particular to get policing and justice quickly established, has caused real difficulties.

Soldiers are not policemen. The sooner that we can reduce the number of soldiers in Bosnia, East Timor or Kosovo, the sooner these places can return to normality. It is not a normal feature of any society for Armoured Personnel Carders or tanks to be patrolling the streets. We will not take them away before it is safe. But we should be clear that the futures of these communities lie, ultimately, in their own hands. We can help. We should help. But in the end we are not a substitute for their own responsibility.

We need to address in multinational fora how to provide the civil infrastructure, the administration, the essential services, the police and judiciary to allow fractured societies to recover. This is not a game. We cannot play at social engineering with real societies. We cannot be surprised at each new crisis. The lesson of Kosovo is the lesson of Bosnia is the lesson of East Timor, the lesson of Sierra Leone, the lesson of countless other places worldwide. We must learn it.

But this is to dwell too much on the negatives. Experts on the civil side who cut their teeth in Bosnia are helping us to get it right in Kosovo. Our armed forces are also well prepared, learning from their experiences in Bosnia what works and what doesn't. Increasingly, they are interacting with the communities they protect.

We need to make sure that we make the most of their experiences. We should do more in peacetime to prepare ourselves for these tasks. Although the details will differ, we know broadly what needs to be done. In the military sphere, my country has informed the UN of the sort of capabilities we could bring to future peacekeeping operations. Could this be extended to the civil sphere? Contingency planning which identified needs in key areas; judges, police, administrators, engineers, technical experts on utilities, lawyers might provide nations with the opportunity of identifying what they will bring to a new crisis. Whatever the approach, we need a short cut to establishing a functioning civil administration. We need to win the peace.

We have much to be proud about from our involvement in Kosovo. We were right to intervene, and there is now a future for its people.

From our experiences, I suggest we can learn the following lessons for crisis management in the future:

if we want to make a success of international involvement in any crisis, we need close teamwork. We need to agree our objectives, and how we are going to achieve them. If we make clear that we will act if red lines are crossed, then we must to be prepared to do so. Bullies are encouraged by signs of weakness. But the use of force is only one of the many options open to us. It should always be the option of last resort. We would do well, however, to remember that not to agree leads to inaction. The triumph of evil only requires the good man to do nothing.

We need greater and greater co-operation between the considerable pool of talents which exist in our nations and organisations, so we are ready- or at least readier- if ever there is a next time. We cannot afford to let delay lose the peace. When a ceasefire or a peace agreement is delivered, we need people on the ground to lead and give direction. We have many bright and willing individuals. We must allow them to meet, work or exercise together, to ensure we make best use of their experience.

More widely, we need to streamline our ability to react fast. While respecting national sovereignty, we must speed the process of collective decision making.

And finally, I just want to return briefly to the issue of how to get the most from our scarce resources. The Defence Capabilities Initiative at NATO is good example of how we can cooperate to address particular areas of capability. We should compare notes in other organisations areas to ensure that we are readier to tackle problems in the future.

In sum, my vision of the future is doing more and more together, both as nations and organisations. The organisations we have established and invested so much in are the basic building blocks. What we must have in the future is a collective crisis management capability in which all the key players are ready and able to play their part, know what role others are going to play and have confidence in them to do it.

We now need imagination and personal commitment from the leaders of these organisations and the states which make them up. We must ensure that we make the most of their strengths if we are to make it easier to achieve our objectives in the future.

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